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Egyptian-Israeli Relations: Is War likely?
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Egyptian-Israeli Relations: Is War likely?

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Khaled Hassan
Jun 18, 2025
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Khaled Hassan
Egyptian-Israeli Relations: Is War likely?
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In 2019, I spent days preparing a report for a senior Israeli diplomat in the UK, analysing Israel’s public diplomacy and strategic posture towards the Arab world—particularly Egypt. Drafted overnight in a London studio flat’s kitchen, the report was admittedly rough around the edges, yet it pinpointed critical Israeli deficiencies and proposed concrete recommendations. More significantly, the exchange revealed what I believe is Israel’s Achilles heel: a mindset I encountered firsthand, one that precipitated the Yom Kippur surprise and, tragically, the October 7th massacre.

Scholars like Dr Itai Shapira have meticulously dissected Israel’s intelligence culture (notably in his book, Israeli National Intelligence Culture). This article, however, addresses a distinct flaw: the inherent inability of Israeli decision-makers and intelligence analysts to distinguish friend from foe. I offer this critique as an Egyptian with extensive experience engaging Egyptian state officials and policymakers.

The ‘Concept’: Anatomy of a Systemic Failure

The ‘Concept’ (Hebrew: Ha-Konseptsia) is a deeply institutionalised cognitive framework that biases threat assessment. It filters intelligence through predetermined conclusions, dismissing contradictory evidence as deception, posturing or noise. This collective mindset overrides empirical data, creating catastrophic blind spots. Its hallmarks include:

  • Deterrence Delusion: Assuming adversaries are rationally constrained by Israel’s military superiority (e.g., “Hamas is deterred and focused on governance”).

  • Intent Misreading: Substituting evidence with mirror-imaging (e.g., framing Hamas’s Yahya Sinwar as a “pragmatist” disinterested in escalation).

  • Imperative Neglect: Ignoring adversaries’ geopolitical or moral compulsions (e.g., disregarding Hamas’s drive to disrupt Arab-Israeli normalisation, or Egypt’s fiscal crisis after Gulf states halted unconditional aid to President Sisi).

Historical Precedents: 1973 and 2023

1973 Yom Kippur War

  • Faulty Assumption: Arab states would not attack without air superiority and Soviet backing.

  • Ignored Warnings: Israeli intelligence explicitly warned Golda Meir of imminent Syrian-Egyptian coordination and military movement, but decision-makers dismissed it as "posturing".

  • Consequence: Delayed mobilization led to 2,800 Israeli deaths in the war's first 48 hours

2023 Hamas Attack

  • Faulty Assumption: Hamas was economically contained (via Qatari funds) and militarily incapable of complex offensives.

  • Ignored Warnings:

    • Hamas battle plans ("The Promise of Judgement Day") were obtained in 2018 and 2022 but deemed "unrealistic".

    • Low-level alerts (e.g., Hamas training on Israeli kibbutz models) were dismissed due to strategic complacency.

  • Consequence: 1,200 Israelis killed, border defences overwhelmed by low-tech tactics.

Conclusion: Indications and warnings of imminent threats are systematically dismissed by Israeli military and civilian leaders. Deeply held convictions—that intelligence does not reflect hostile intent—override evidence, perpetuating a cycle of strategic surprise.

The Gathering Storm: Egypt as Israel's Next Intelligence Failure in the Making

Israel’s intelligence apparatus appears perilously close to repeating its catastrophic October 7th and Yom Kippur errors—this time concerning Egypt. Despite mounting evidence of strategic shifts, Israeli decision-makers cling to the illusion that President Sisi’s regime poses no threat, ignoring systemic risks in favour of a dangerously simplistic narrative of stable cooperation.

1. The False Comfort of the "Sisi Doctrine"

Israeli national security elites operate under several flawed assumptions about Egypt that mirror pre-October 7th miscalculations about Hamas and pre-Yom Kippur calculations about Ehgypt:

  • "Sisi the Pragmatist" Fallacy: Israel views Sisi as a rational actor solely focused on regime survival, assuming economic dependency on the US and counterterrorism cooperation preclude hostility. This ignores how domestic and regional pressures could force his hand. As public fury over Gaza intensifies amid a collapsing economy in Egypt—with parliamentarians tearing up copies of the peace treaty and nationwide boycotts of Western brands—Sisi's need to placate populist anger threatens bilateral stability. This multidimensional threat is particularly significant due to Sisi’s need to scapegoat Israel for his economic failure, suggesting that increasingly hostile Saudi rhetoric towards Egypt is due to Cairo’s stance as the sole true supporter of the Palestinian cause while other Arab countries are “America’s puppets”.

  • Overindexing on Security Coordination: While military-to-military coordination remains robust (e.g., Sinai counterterrorism), Israel dismisses how this coexists with institutionalised anti-Israel incitement. State clerics, and most recently ministers, label Jews "killers of the prophets" on television and refuse to recognise Israel’s right to exist, yet Israeli analysts dismiss this as "empty rhetoric" rather than a cultural and religious foundation for future hostility.

  • Economic Interdependence as Shield: Israeli Officials emphasise gas exports and Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) as stabilisers, ignoring their erosion. Reports of suspended Israeli gas exports are framed by Cairo as "Israeli pressure tactics" to flood Sinai with Gazans—a narrative Sisi exploits for nationalist credibility. Economic setbacks are thus weaponised as "patriotism credentials".

2. Ignored Strategic Red Flags: Sinai as the New Philadelphia Corridor

Israel repeats its failure to heed physical warnings, echoing dismissal of Hamas’ border preparations:

  • Treaty Violations as Precursors: Egypt has deployed 45,000–66,000 troops in Sinai—far exceeding Camp David Accords limits—including tanks, F-16 bases, and underground command bunkers. While initially permitted for counterterrorism, these forces now face Israel across the Gaza border. Yet many Israelis dismiss this as "Sisi's internal matter" rather than a threat vector.

  • The Philadelphia Corridor Brinkmanship: Egypt views Israel's control of this buffer zone as a sovereignty violation and has mobilized special forces along the border.

  • Provocative Military Posturing: In autumn 2024, Egypt’s army chief conducted a high-profile tour of reinforced border positions, inspecting tanks and paratroopers—forces irrelevant to counterterrorism. Moreover, after October 7th, an official TV broadcast of Sisi’s visit to the military academy showed Sisi inspecting soldiers conducting military exercises with the Israeli Merkava tank as the main target. These deliberate signals were ignored by Israeli analysts who continue to argue they represent empty rhetoric for domestic consumption.

3. Cognitive Biases Reborn: Dismissing Egypt's Capabilities and Constraints

The same analytical pathologies that blinded Israel to Hamas and pre-Yom Kippur Egypt resurface in current Egypt assessments:

  • Mirror Imaging: Assuming Sisi shares Israel's threat perceptions (e.g., Hamas), despite Egypt prioritizing Israeli actions as its primary regional risk. Cairo explicitly warned that Netanyahu's policies "fuel extremism" and threaten Sinai stability—warnings filed away as "diplomatic noise".

  • Deterrence Overconfidence: Believing economic leverage (gas dependency) and U.S. influence constrain Egypt, just as Qatar's funds were thought to "deter" Hamas.

  • Underestimating Enemy Agency: Dismissing Egypt's diplomatic offensives (most notably refusal to exchange ambassadors) as "symbolic" replicates the error of labelling Hamas’ exercises "propaganda." In reality, these build legal/political scaffolding for escalation—potentially including treaty abandonment.

Table: Parallels Between Pre-October 7th Hamas Misconceptions and Current Egypt Assessments

Table: Egypt's Treaty Violations vs. Israeli Dismissals

Assessment

President Sisi’s leadership trajectory since 7th October indicates a strategic pivot towards increasingly hostile rhetoric and positioning against Israel and Jewish interests. This shift appears calculated as a regime preservation tactic amidst Egypt’s deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation, particularly from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As Egypt’s estrangement from the GCC deepens, economy and Saudi-Egyptian relations worsen, Sisi perceives escalating anti-Israel rhetoric and fostering ties with China and Iran as politically expedient, absent significant countervailing pressure (e.g., from the Trump government).

Background Context

Following Mohamed Morsi’s ouster, President Sisi deliberately positioned himself as a pragmatic reformist and a force for regional stability, countering the Muslim Brotherhood’s religiously motivated antisemitism and advocating normalisation with Israel. This allowed him to attract substantial financial and political backing. However, a significant inflection point occurred in 2021/22. The GCC’s withdrawal of unconditional financial support, underscored by Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan’s 2023 declaration that future aid would be conditional on reforms and structured as strategic investments, removed a critical economic lifeline. Facing mounting economic pressures exacerbated by this GCC recalibration, the Sisi regime has increasingly resorted to pan-Arabist, anti-American, and stridently pro-Palestinian rhetoric. This posture serves to deflect domestic discontent and compensate for the loss of Gulf patronage.

Exercise: Challenging Personal Misconceptions

Acutely aware of cognitive biases, I conducted a structured exercise over recent days (Prior to June 13th) to interrogate my own assumptions regarding Egypt’s evolving stance towards Israel since October 7th. This involved consulting four individuals with distinct perspectives:

  1. An American veteran, intelligence professional and academic;

  2. Three Egyptians possessing granular understanding and insightful experience of Egypt’s domestic politics and decision-making machinery

I posed the following questions to each:

In nutshell

Cairo historically viewed the pre-October 7th status quo with Israel as economically advantageous, underpinned by the Camp David Treaty’s stabilising influence. This alignment was driven by the treaty’s role in securing critical fiscal stability—including sustained US aid ($1.3 billion annually) and Gulf investment—which bolstered regime survival. Escalation with Israel was seen as counterproductive, risking these material benefits that, in turn, risked regime survival.

Egypt’s deepening economic crisis—marked by currency devaluation, inflation exceeding 30%, and withdrawal of unconditional Gulf financial support—eroded the treaty’s perceived value. Consequently, President Sisi has instrumentalised anti-Israel posturing as a primary mechanism to legitimise his rule and win popular support, especially as anti-Israel sentiments are exceptionally popular in Egypt.

Disclaimer: this is a developing situation. I continue to monitor indications and warnings for emerging and shifting developments.

The Antidote: Rewiring Israeli Risk Assessment Regarding the Arab World

1. Capacity Over Intention: Recalibrating Risk Fundamentals

Risk must be defined by capability + intent, yet Israel’s fatal flaw is over-indexing on perceived intent. Consider:

If your neighbour owns a gun but shows no hostile intent, they pose minimal risk. If they possess both gun and intent, they become an imminent threat.
Israel’s intelligence community obsessively analyses intent while downplaying capability. Recommendation: Prioritise adversarial capacity (e.g., Egypt’s Sinai militarisation) as the primary risk indicator, treating intent as secondary or unknowable.

2. Proactive Defusal: Beyond Reactive Warfare

Contrary to claims Israel has "abandoned misconceptions" post-October 7th, its engagements remain fundamentally reactive:

  • Hezbollah made northern Israel uninhabitable before retaliation.

  • Hamas committed atrocities before the Gaza offensive.

  • Iran/Houthis inflicted economic damage before counterstrikes.
    Recommendation: Adopt non-violent but confrontational measures to pre-emptively disarm threats—e.g., seek pre-emptive US sanctions against antisemitic and anti-Israel officials, or diplomatic offensives to sanction antisemitic, pro-terror politicians and media outlets/figures.

3. Rhetoric as Strategic Signal

Israeli officials routinely dismiss enemy rhetoric (e.g., threats to "destroy Israel") as "domestic posturing for antisemitic audiences." This is not merely wishful thinking—it is strategic negligence.

  • Pattern Recognition: Historically, systematic anti-Israel rhetoric and threats invariably precede confrontation:

    • Hezbollah/Hamas: Incitement → terror campaigns.

    • Iran: "Wiping Israel off the map" → proxy warfare.

    • Egypt: State-media vilification → treaty violations.
      Recommendation: Treat escalating rhetoric, particularly one with a highly threatening tone, as a core early-warning indicator. When adversaries broadcast intent and possess capability, Israel must act—not debate their "sincerity."

Implementing the Framework

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